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A POPPERIAN APPROACH AND ITS LIMITATIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of recent work applying
Popper’s theory of the growth of knowledge to entrepreneurship and market
processes. This perspective takes as its starting point the fact that profit
opportunities do not leap out of the business environment and tell
entrepreneurs how to conceive them. Rather, these opportunities are
personally created mental constructs. When the market changes or evidence
is generated about the effects of past decisions, any learning that happens is
not automatic or exogenously determined. It is instead a consequence of
entrepreneurs choosing to test particular hypotheses in the market and to
interpret the results according to the rules of their own learning
methodologies. The Popperian approach sees entrepreneurship as a kind of
scientific process of discovery and learning in which entrepreneurs form
conjectures, select which ones to test and make judgments about revising
them in the light of evidence from testing their plans in the market (Harper
and Earl 1996: 306--7).
The development of a Popperian approach is warranted because there has
not been sufficient constructive debate aimed at providing an alternative to
Kirzner’s theory of entrepreneurship -- though there have been plenty of
critiques. Kirzner’s is the most significant recent contribution to the theory of
entrepreneurship. It represents an important advance upon mainstream
neoclassical theory because it enhances our understanding of market
processes rather than equilibrium states.
However, from the point of view of theories of the growth of knowledge,
Kirzner’s theory does not provide a complete account of the market process.
First, there is a distinct lack of symmetry in Kirzner’s treatment of
entrepreneurship: only ex post successful entrepreneurship  is considered
and explained. His entrepreneurs do not face structural uncertainty, they do
not make mistakes, they do not make losses, their business do not fail, they
do not disrupt plans and their actions are rarely, if ever, disequilibrating.
Second, and following on from the first, Kirzner’s conception of
entrepreneurial knowledge is not truly dynamic. Once accepted as a basis for
action, entrepreneurial conjectures are never refuted during the execution of
3the entrepreneur’s plan. An entrepreneur’s knowledge of market data does
not change as decisions are made in the course of exploiting a particular
profit opportunity.
Third, Kirzner presumes that there is some intuitive and psychological
learning process by which entrepreneurs can acquire true knowledge of
market conditions. Alert entrepreneurs discover opportunities by simply
“opening their eyes” and noticing facts (“$20 bills lying on the ground”) that
had previously been overlooked by all other market participants. I consider
this to be an inadequate explanation of how entrepreneurs acquire
knowledge in a disequilibrium setting.
For these reasons, I think Popperian insights are important to injecting a
more sophisticated approach to knowledge and learning in the theory of
entrepreneurship. The Popperian approach is concerned with the rules that
economic agents adopt in order to obtain knowledge required for decision-
making. In contrast to Kirzner, it relaxes the assumption that entrepreneurs
do not make mistakes and that they tend to be successful by definition.
Indeed, it examines the nature, causes and effects of entrepreneurial error.
Furthermore, it does not assume that there is a strict tendency towards
coordination of economic activities in markets. It considers both
disequilibrating and equilibrating changes that occur as a result of
entrepreneurial activity.
1.1 Organisation of the paper
In the first section of this paper, I explain the distinguishing characteristics of
the Popperian approach. I describe the overall goals of the project, the
characteristics of a more sophisticated economic theory of entrepreneurial
learning, and how Popper’s theory of the growth of knowledge can help build
an economic theory with these characteristics. I also indicate the range of
applications of the new approach that have already been undertaken so far.
In the second section, I specify in some detail the hard-core assumptions and
rules of the Popperian program. I am also explicit about the motivational and
rationality assumptions that I make about entrepreneurs.
In Section 3, I analyse how entrepreneurs learn from their market
experiences in real time. I want to unpack what exactly is involved in testing
plans in the market. In particular, I investigate what happens when the real
4world disappoints entrepreneurs by not conforming to their expectations, and
the type of learning and plan revision that may follow from it. I examine the
difficulties that entrepreneurs have in interpreting the results of testing their
plans in the market and I look at the range of strategies that entrepreneurs
can use for dealing with such situations. I then draw out the implications of
this approach for the endogeneity of entrepreneurial learning processes.
In the final section I discuss the potential criticisms of applying Popper’s
conception of rationality to entrepreneurship and possible responses to such
a critique.
1.2 Overall goal of the project
As already mentioned, the overall goal of this project is to provide a more
sophisticated theory of how entrepreneurs learn. I consider that such a
theory is important because it is:
· a prerequisite to any explanation of sequential entrepreneurial
decision-making
· and thus a prerequisite to any theory of the endogenous dynamics of the
market process.
I propose that a more sophisticated theory of entrepreneurial learning is
likely to have several characteristics:
(a) it will emphasise that entrepreneurs' knowledge is always conjectural and
tentative. Entrepreneurs can only ever have theories of what consumer
preferences are, together with conjectures about what new uses for an input
are possible and what new technologies might achieve.
(b) it will take full account of entrepreneurial errors, losses and failure, and
not just treat them as a residual. This is especially important given empirical
studies have suggested that most new innovative ideas do actually turn out
to be mistakes. It is necessary to emphasise genuine uncertainty, the
unpredictability of the future growth of knowledge, and the potential for
discontinuity. It will also acknowledge the possibility that entrepreneurs can
disrupt plans and be a disequilibrating force.
(c) it will depict individuals' knowledge as a dynamic and evolving system
rather than a static or stationary structure. The theory should allow
5knowledge to change as decisions are made in the course of exploiting profit
opportunities. It should not conflate initial plans with the execution of plans.
(d) it will not just emphasise the imaginative and intuitive components of
learning and entrepreneurship, but it will also stress the rational and critical
aspects of enterprising activity. I am interested in how the entrepreneur must
apply critical methods of error elimination in attempting to solve market
problems at a profit.
(e) it should provide a broad conception of the scope of market processes
and other learning processes. It should allow more than one type of
economic change, not just equilibration in response to exogenous
disturbances. Thus, it must seek to explain and hence dogenise
disequilibrating economic changes - including changes in technology,
resources and tastes. It should not treat forces that create disequilibrium as
necessarily exogenous to the market system and, therefore, as by definition
outside the scope of economic analysis.
(f) it should make novel predictions about entrepreneurship and market
processes which are capable of being tested empirically.
1.3 Why Popper’s theory of the growth of knowledge?
Brian Loasby, Peter Earl, James Wible and Lawrence Boland have argued
for some time that philosophical theories of the growth of knowledge can
provide significant insights into how markets operate and how people learn
from their experiences within the market. It is suggested that by extending
the scope of these theories, science can be taken as a generalised model of
sophisticated decision-making in structurally uncertain and complex problem
situations.
My approach therefore draws upon the abundant literature in the philosophy
of science - in particular, Popper's, and to a lesser extent Lakatos's, theories
of the growth of knowledge.
Popper’s theory is an appropriate starting point since it exhibits many of the
desirable characteristics of a theory of learning described earlier. It is the first
non-justificationist philosophy in the history of the philosophy of science. It is
non-justificationist in that it divorces knowledge from certainty, proof, and
hard facts. According to Popper, all knowledge is t ntative and conjectural.
6These conjectures can never be positively justified or proven true. Theories
are simply genuine conjectures - highly informative guess about the world.
Popper elaborates a fallibillistic theory of knowledge - according to which all
learning is depicted as a process of trial and error.
Finally, Popper vindicates problems of the growth of knowledge. He employs
a dynamic evolutionary conception of knowledge rather than a structural
concept. Problems connected with the growth of knowledge are the most
central problems of his epistemology. Popper sees all learning as a
sequence of continuous conjecture and refutation.
My approach involves the direct application of Popper's theory. It does not
simply rely upon a metaphor. The relationship between scientific and market
processes is not just that of analogy because the growth of knowledge is the
subject of both.
1.4 Range of applications of the Popperian approach
The overall project investigates entrepreneurship and market processes
within a Popperian framework. To date, there have been four main
applications of Popperian insights:
(a) a theory of entrepreneurial learning -- how entrepreneurs improve their
knowledge in a disequilibrium setting. This theory examines the nature,
causes and effects of entrepreneurial errors.
(b) a model of venture capitalist decision-making -- the screening of
entrepreneurial ideas by venture capitalists and other transactors in the
market process. Indeed, the process of interpersonal criticism within the
external venture capital market may be the paragon of critical rationalism in
the context of the growth of market knowledge.
(c) a theory of entrepreneurial firms. Such an approach introduces a theory
of learning into the theory of the firm. It provides an explanation of the growth
of firms and the long-run evolution of business strategy and structure.
(d) a preliminary framework for analysing market processes. The Popperian
approach has implications for: how the market process operates, how it is
organised, the criteria by which it screens new ideas, the origins and
7continuity of this process, and its comparative performance in generating and
testing  new entrepreneurial conjectures.
Table 1: Range of applications of the Popperian approach
Application Source
Theory of entrepreneurial
learning
Choi (1993), Harper (1994,
1996); Loasby (1986)
Theory of entrepreneurial
firms
Earl (1984: Ch.5; 1992);
Harper (1996); Harper and
Earl (1996); Loasby (1971,
1976, 1983)
A model of venture capitalist
decision-making
Harper (1992: Chs 10 and
11)
Theory of the market
process
Harper (1996: Ch.9)
As yet, there are no applications of the Popperian approach to public policy
issues related to entrepreneurship and market processes.
The scope of this paper is limited to considering the first of these
applications: the question of how entrepreneurs learn.
2 THE SPECIFICATION OF THE POPPERIAN APPROACH
Before considering the subject of entrepreneurial learning, I need to explain
in more detail what the Popperian  approach involves.
In this section, I specify what I call the “growth of knowledge (GK)” research
program. We can also refer to it as the non-justificationist program or the
Popperian approach, and I will use these terms interchangeably. This
program can be regarded as a set of assumptions and rules that we are
going to use for thinking about en repreneurship and market processes.
Following Lakatos, these descriptive assumptions and normative rules are
called hard-core propositions and positive heuristics, respectively.
82.1 The hard core of the Popperian program
The hard core describes the most basic assumptions upon which the new
approach is built. The key hard-core assumption states that learning is a
logical process rather than an internal psychological or soci psychological
process (H6). In so far as they embody rational decision-making,
entrepreneurs reason correctly when reaching conclusions by connected
thought. Learning from market experiences, and especially the experience of
error, involves deductive reasoning. In testing plans in the market, economic
agents need logical rules for rationally rejecting the particular conjectures
and assumptions on which their disappointed plans were based. The
approach thus assumes that there is no difference of kind between the
methods of science and the methods of hypothesis-selection in everyday life.
2.2 The positive heuristic
As well as the descriptive hard core, the Popperian program has a normative
set of rules for doing economics. The program attempts to pursue the
principles of methodological individualism more aggressively by prescribing a
more detailed and individualistic treatment of economic agents' knowledge
and learning. It seeks to build methodology into the cont nt of theories of
economic processes in order to explain how economic agents acquire the
knowledge required to make decisions. The most important heuristic
recommends explicitly ascribing Popperian theories of learning to the
economic agents in economic theories (PH1).
9Table 2: The hard core of the Popperian program
Hard-core
assumption
Description
HC1 Only individual economic agents have aims, conjectures and
preferences, and only individuals can make decisions.
HC2 Economic agents face objective problem situations, and an
objective reality exists which is independent of their
conjectures and preferences.
HC3 There is no infallible method by which economic agents can
acquire true knowledge. The knowledge of economic agents
is essentially theoretical and conjectural, and their knowledge
of the objective situation is very often false. Consequently, all
economic agents are fallible (i.e. prone to error).
HC4 Economic agents form their tentative solutions (i.e.
conjectures) to problems in a world of structural uncertainty,
complexity, and real time.
HC5 The conjectures of economic agents are potentially objective
(i.e. they can become conscious and can be articulated), and
they can potentially be exposed to interpersonal criticism.
HC6 Learning is a logical and scientific process rather than an
internal psychological or socio-psychological process. There
is no fundamental difference of kind between the methods of
science and the methods of hypothesis selection in everyday
life. Like scientists, economic agents use deductive logic in
the evaluation of their hypotheses.
HC7 Although economic agents do not possess proven true
knowledge, they can still make rational decisions. Rational
decision-making involves evaluating rival schemes of action
in the light of logic and experience.
HC8 Entrepreneurship is characterised by "multiple-exit" problem
situations.
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Table 3: The positive heuristic of the Popperian program
Positive
heuristic
Description
PH1 Explicitly ascribe Popperian theories of learning to the
economic agents in economic theories.
PH2 In any explanation of economic phenomena (especially
dynamic economic processes), progressively upgrade those
aspects which pertain to the growth of knowledge and the
theories of learning with which economic agents approach
their problem situations. In particular, try to reduce as much
as possible the inductivist and justificationist elements in
agents' learning methodologies and theories of knowledge.
PH3 Only construct theories and models which are consistent with
the principles of methodological individualism.
PH4 Construct models in which only rational decision-making
plays a part in the explanation.
PH5 Construct dynamic models which explicitly recognise the
relationship between real time and knowledge. That is,
construct models employing a dynamic conception of
economic agents' knowledge, according to which the
acquisition of knowledge (i.e. learning) is a real-time and
irreversible process. Develop models which treat economic
agents' knowledge and learning processes as endogenous
rather than as exogenously fixed or exogenously variable.
PH6 Construct multiple-exit decision models.
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2.3 The aim structure of entrepreneurs, and the theories they hold
The Popperian theory assumes that entrepreneurs aim to predict, to explain
and to control economic and market events in the pursuit of economic gain.
In order to fulfil their basic aims of explaining the world in which they operate
and of effecting changes within it, entrepreneurs need to construct theories.
It is suggested that in developing entrepreneurial ideas for new business
ventures, entrepreneurs put together three main types of empirical theories:
· theories of latent demand: this involves conjectures about the most urgent
of the as yet unsolved problems of consumers and conjectures about the
new bundles of product characteristics that will satisfy these latent
demands. It also includes conjectures about the price-quantity-quality
configurations by which target consumers will be willing to buy the
entrepreneur’s new product over a period of time.
· theories of production: it contains conjectures about the technological
possibilities of combining given inputs into novel products or of obtaining
given product concepts from novel combinations of inputs.
· theories of governance: this involves conjectures about the critical
dimensions with respect to which economic transactions differ and
hypotheses about the most efficient and flexible ways of organising
certain types of transactions.
3 APPLICATION : HOW ENTREPRENEURS CHANGE THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND
PLANS
This section is concerned with explaining how individuals -- especially
entrepreneurs -- learn from their experiences within the market. To explain
how entrepreneurs learn, I highlight the role of an entrepreneur's learning
methodology as a device for handling and responding to change. The
entrepreneur's methodology determines how fast he or she identifies
significant errors, responds to them and learns from them over time. In short,
an entrepreneur's methodology is the "technology" by which
counterexamples to his or her ideas are processed into changes in the
entrepreneur's conjectures and plans.
I focus upon entrepreneurs who learn from their mistakes and the refutation
of their ideas. These “Popperian” entrepreneurs, as I call them, artificially
make the growth of their knowledge more intensive by consciously adopting
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an overtly critical and systematic approach to problem-solving. Like
scientists, these entrepreneurs carry out piecemeal experiments as a way of
acquiring knowledge by comparing the results observed with the results
expected.
They acknowledge the tentative and conjectural nature of all knowledge,
including their own, and recognise that many entrepreneurial forays into the
unknown turn out to be mistakes in their original form. They emphasise that
since they can learn from their mistakes, it is desirable to discover their
mistakes as fast as possible (e.g. because new product development costs
rise exponentially). Consequently, they conduct severe tests in order to
expose their conjectures to refutation.
More technically, we can say that to assist their own learning, Popperian
entrepreneurs adopt:
· the falsifiability principle, which offers broad policy direction for the
selection of ideas
· and a set of methodological rules which they use in testing those ideas.
3.1 The falsifiability principle
An entrepreneur’s theory is falsifiable in principle if there exists some
imaginable market event, or set of events, which is inconsistent with the
theory, that is, which if it were in fact to occur, would falsify the conjecture.
For example, consider the following hypothesis:
T1: all male consumers will respond favourably (in terms of attention,
interest, and arousal) to the advertising copy for our innovative health
insurance package;
T1 is falsifiable. A priori, there are opportunities for T1 to clash with
conceivable market events. There are conceivable market events which
could contradict T1: e.g. some male consumers do not respond favourably to
the advertising copy. There is a chance for T1 to be refuted by experience. It
can be subjected to severe testing.
The basic thrust behind the falsifiability principle is that entrepreneurs must
attempt to specify in advance under what conditions they will regard their
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theories as refuted. The entrepreneur should specify those falsifying
conditions as exactly as possible in order to avoid ad hoc post-experimental
adjustments (something like this is evident in techniques of market
segmentation and market targeting).
The falsifiability principle is simply a way of enhancing the quality of negative
feedback from testing plans. It increases the speed of learning from
experience. Entrepreneurs prefer those ideas which have a higher degree of
falsifiability because they convey more empirical information. The more
falsifiable a theory is, the more it asserts about the market because it rules
out more market events that could conceivably happen.
3.2 Methodological rules
Popperian entrepreneurs adopt methodological rules which ensure the
falsifiability of their ideas. They make the decision to adopt these rules in
order to promote the growth of their knowledge. The basic tenet of these
rules is that entrepreneurs should not systematically evade refutation by
continually reformulating either their ideas or the evidence in order to avoid a
conflict between them.
Thus, Popperian entrepreneurs avoid dogmatic strategies for immunising
their own ideas against refutation. In particular, they avoid:
· introducing ad hoc solutions or hypotheses (e.g. substantial decline in
market growth dismissed as normal seasonal fluctuation)
· always adopting a sceptical attitude to the reliability of the experiment or
experimenter (e.g. market research firm).
These dogmatic tactics must be avoided because they serve to reduce the
informative content of the entrepreneurs’ ideas and so diminish the scope of
what the entrepreneur can say about the world.
3.3 Difficulties in interpreting the results of testing plans in the market
In no way is it assumed that the testing of plans is a simple or mechanical
affair. Indeed, I investigate the difficulties which economic agents encounter
in interpreting market evidence, in pinpointing the source or cause of specific
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plan failure, in deciding whether their plans have been effectively refuted and
in determining whether to abandon a particular course of action.
The Duhem-Quine irrefutability thesis emerges as the most important and
comprehensive problem in this regard. The thesis argues that a single
hypothesis can never be falsified conclusively because it is necessary to test
the hypothesis in combination with additional premises.
Expressed symbolically, an entrepreneur faces the following situation
whenever his or her plans cannot be carried out in the market without
disappointment:
[(T·A®P) · (~P)] ® ~(T·A)
where T is the specific idea which the entrepreneur is testing, A is the
entrepreneur's set of background assumptions and T·A is their conjunction,
P is the entrepreneur's prediction (e.g. about the existence of a profit
opportunity), and the symbols ®, · and ~ mean "imply", "conjoined with" and
"not", respectively.
For example, suppose that an entrepreneur wishes to test a hunch (T) about
the market:
T There is a LATENT DEMAND for at least 1000 units per
week of a new PC business simulation game (Profitania)
at a unit price of $ 45.00 within Northeastern USA during
the summer months of 1999.
In order to undertake a market test of his idea, the entrepreneur must
specify an elaborate "experimental hook up" which consists of a hierarchy of
auxiliary assumptions (A1.....Am; C1...Cn), which include such things as:
A1 Linking to a Virtual Pet Cemetery Website is an effective
promotional and istributional channel for this market
experiment
A2 The particular advertising copy on the W bsite is
appropriate (in terms of visual appearance, accessibility
and readability) for the successful test marketing of this
new business simulation game
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A3 LavaMind’s online Website store which accepts major
credit cards is an effective method for enabling
consumers to place their orders.
A4 Timing: A test market conducted during the first week of
July is a representative test.
From the target hypothesis T and these and other auxiliary assumptions
(A1.....Am, C1...Cn), the entrepreneur derives the testable prediction, P,  that
she can sell over 1000 items of the new product at a price of $ 45 during the
first week of July in Northeastern USA during 1999:
Major premise: If T (and A1.....Am, C1...Cn) are true, then P is true;
Minor premise: T (and A1.....Am, C1...Cn) are true;
Conclusion: therefore P is true.
Should the entrepreneur's cluster of hypotheses be refuted by testing in the
market, the question arises as to what exactly is deemed to be refuted by
that particular market test: the entrepreneur's target conjecture and/or one or
more of the auxiliary conditions?
There is nothing to prevent the entrepreneur from sticking to her target
hypothesis (T) and arguing that the latent demand for the new product does
indeed exist but that poor sales resulted because one of the cooperating
assumptions was false: namely, the distribution channel used was
inappropriate, or the advertising copy was inappropriate, or the information
system was not working as expected. (The entrepreneur could also invoke a
number of other immunising stratagems.) Furthermore, the disappointing test
results may be due to any conjunction of these factors.
3.4 Possible strategies entrepreneurs can use to respond to apparent
refutations and the Duhem-Quine problem
People cope in different ways with the apparent failure of their plans and the
DQ problem. Possible strategies entrepreneurs can adopt range from minor
tinkering of their theories to devising altogether new sets of conjectures
which replace their original assumptions and ideas:
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(i) challenge the original derivation of his or her prediction (e.g. P: "There is a
profit opportunity in the space-time region k") by showing that P does not in
fact follow logically from the conjunction of his or her target hypothesis (T)
and the auxiliary assumptions (A);
(ii) only modify his or her theory (T) by minor changes;
(iii) reject T (i.e. dramatically revise his or her basic theory) and keep the set
of supplementary hypotheses (A);
(iv) stick to the theory (T) and reject one or more of the cooperating
hypotheses (A);
(v) reject his or her entire set of conjectures (i.e. both the specific theory T
and the supplementary hypotheses A) and devise an altogether new set
(T'·A');
(vi) try to identify any parts of his or her set of conjectures which are
independent of the failed plan (and hence which are not involved in the
refutation of that plan by market testing), thereby reducing the scope of the
DQ problem.
It is argued that the scope and order of responses that people are willing to
try will depend upon their particular methodology.
Entrepreneurs who subscribe to conventionalist methodology prefer
uncritical, conservative responses to apparent refutations and the DQ
problem. They will only try the least drastic, ad hoc solutions and will never
consider more extensive alterations to their plans even after earlier revisions
have failed. Consequently, conventionalist entrepreneurs make minor ad hoc
adjustments to their sets of conjectures, for example, by attributing the
responsibility for their failed plans to one or more of the supplementary
hypotheses that they made in order to test those very plans in the market
(strategy iv above).
In contrast, Popperian entrepreneurs consider that strategy iv must not be
pursued each time that a plan fails a market test. They will tend to revise
their basic theories or will try to devise entirely new conjectural frameworks
when they experience r peated disappointment in the market (strategies iii
and v, respectively). However, these entrepreneurs are most unlikely to
develop a completely new set of first principles every time their plans are
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frustrated, because if they were to do so, they would never be able to see a
venture through to completion and would be forever returning to the drawing
board. Thus, falsificationist entrepreneurs generally aim to scrutinise and to
retest their stocks of background knowledge in a more or less piecemeal
fashion.
3.5 The endogeneity of entrepreneurs' learning processes
The Popperian approach results in an evolutionary conception of the
entrepreneur's learning process, which emphasises its endogenous nature.
According to this model, the entrepreneur's learning process consists in
going from problems to deeper problems and subproblems. Entrepreneurial
activity begins and ends with problems. Because the entrepreneur’s
problems are ill-structured, the entrepreneur’s task does not begin with the
attempt to solve a problem, but rather the attempt to define the problem and
to account for why it is a problem. As in scientific discovery, the generation of
new hypotheses is "problemistic": the entrepreneur has a particular problem
to solve and that problem galvanises the entrepreneur into creating potential
solutions.
A falsification of an idea implies that the entrepreneur should develop a
better trial solution because his or her conjecture or plan in its present form
cannot solve all its problems: "For to regard a theory [say, TSi] as falsified is
to be aware of a problem [P i + 1] whose solution will require some sort of
theoretical innovation [TSi + 1]" (Musgrave 1971: 33; parentheses added).
And even when succeeding in solving any particular market problem, the
entrepreneur discovers new problems so that his or her learning process is
conceivably without end.
Diagram 1
The endogenous process of learning
P1  -> TS1 ->   EE1 -> P2
P2  -> TS2 ->   EE2 -> P3
P3  -> TS3 ->   EE3 -> P4
  .    .      .   .
  .    .      .   .
  .    .      .   .
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  .    .      .   .
Pn  -> TSn ->    EEn -> Pn+1
A simple reconstruction of a real-world example may help illustrate the point:
P1: to obtain resources to produce a new magazine
TS1: business plan: budget for the purchase of a large piece of capital
equipment
EE1: refuted by testing in the capital market because of unacceptable
financial structure
P2: to devise a plan with an acceptable financial structure so as to
obtain finance from a bank
TS2: revised plan: budget for the lease of the equipment at
conventional rates.
The diagram provides some insights into the continuity of the market
process. It shows that an entrepreneur’s learning process is both ongoing
and non-determinate and that it is pervaded by endogenous changes. Given
that the market process is generated by the interaction in the market of
individual decision-makers as they learn from their new experiences and
revise their plans, it follows that the market process too is made up of a
series of endogenous changes taking place over time.
We can generalise this evolutionary model of learning to explain how the
market process can be perpetuated by purely endogenous forces.
Unexpected new problems and opportunities may emerge as the often
unintended byproducts of entrepreneurial solutions to previous market
problems. Thus, disequilibrium is something endogenous to the operation of
the market process itself; it is endogenously-created change.
The Popperian model does not treat changes in tastes, technology and
resources as necessarily exogenous to the market system. For example, in
trying to formulate profitable solutions to perceived market problems,
entrepreneurs may develop new technologies and discover new uses for
inputs.
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4 LIMITATIONS OF THE POPPERIAN APPROACH
As mentioned earlier, a key hard-core assumption of the Popp rian program is
that there is no difference of kind between the methods of science and those of
practical decision-making in everyday life. Science is merely a highly
sophisticated case of human problem-solving activity. The Popperian program
assumes that the method of trial and error- limination (i.e. the method of
conjecture and refutation) is fundamentally the method both of science and of
decision-making in other fields of human activity, including entrepreneurship.
This is not an uncontroversial assumption. Several authors (e.g. Salanti 1987)
make a deep and sharp separation between scientific and practical rationality,
and they criticise proposals to portray economic agents as Popperian
decision-makers.
In the following discussion, I summarise their philosophical and empirical
criticisms. I also provide a Popperian defence of the application of Popper’s
conception of rationality to entrepreneurship. I argue that many of the
criticisms spring either from:
· a false conception of the goals of economic agents
· a false, justificationist conception of science
· a misunderstanding of the experimental methods in the natural sciences
(especially physics).
(a) The epistemic aims and methods of science differ from those of individual
economic agents
According to this argument, entrepreneurs aim for predictive success and
success in their practical actions. They pursue  profit. Unlike scientists,
entrepreneurs are not at all concerned with the pursuit of truth because
successful action does not require true knowledge. In the short-run, an
entrepreneur’s theories do not need to be true to be profitable. The pursuit of
truth and the pursuit of profit may even conflict. Thus, because the practical
aims of entrepreneurs differ from the theoretical aims of science, their
corresponding methods must differ.
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A response to this argument is that it is incorrect to propose that innovative
entrepreneurs are only concerned with short-run predictive success.
Entrepreneurs are hard-nosed realists who aim to make sense of the world. If
entrepreneurs aim to create a new market for a new product, they may expect to
be able to achieve their goal more effectively, the better they understand market
needs, the nature of existing obstacles to trade, and the operation and relations
between existing markets (though success is never assured and can be
achieved in other ways).
Indeed, entrepreneurs undertake specific actions with the express aim of
augmenting their knowledge of markets and technologies. Entrepreneurs
frequently test the plausibility of their market assumptions by obtaining
in-depth customer reaction during the new product development process.
Venture capitalists also examine the realism of the entrepreneur's
assumptions in the business plan.
(b) Scientific knowledge is different in kind from the practical knowledge of
economic agents
This demarcation is most prominent in the work of Hayek and to a lesser extent
in that of Lachmann and of  O'Driscoll and Rizzo.
The Hayek-Lachmann demarcation between scientific and practical knowledge
can be summarised as follows. Scientific knowledge is proven true, inherently
static and objective. It is theoretical and comprises only general rules (i.e.
universal laws and hypotheses). It relates to the typical and permanent features
of the world. In contrast, practical knowledge is potentially false and may quickly
become out of date. As well as being tacit, it is also nontheoretical (comprising
as it does information about particular facts). And it pertains only to specific
transient and local conditions (i.e. it comprises empirical knowledge of the
particular circumstances of time and place).
A major problem with the Hayek-Lachmann distinction is that it is based upon a
false, justificationist theory of knowledge which equates scientific knowledge with
proven truth. Scientific theories cannot be distinguished as different in kind from
practical knowledge because they are provable. Knowledge - whether practical
or scientific - cannot be proven true, even if it is true. Like practical knowledge,
scientific knowledge can also be false. Far from being static, established
scientific knowledge can be overthrown and replaced by better scientific
theories. There is competition between scientific theories just as there is
21
competition between dispersed bits of market knowledge; the Darwinian struggle
for survival is common to both domains.
In addition, all practical knowledge (including empirical knowledge of profit
opportunities) is essentially theoretical and hence conjectural. Entrepreneurs
have to select which "bits of information" are relevant to the discovery of profit
opportunities. The selection of these "facts" implies a point of view on the part of
the entrepreneur, and that point of view is itself a theory.
Furthermore, scientific knowledge is not restricted to universal laws as
construed by Hayek. Popper explicitly denies that only universal statements
of laws belong to science. Indeed, given his criterion of testability for
demarcating science, he acknowledges that singular statements can belong
to science, provided they are testable, and all singular test statements do
(Popper 1974: 988).
(c) The variability of economic conditions precludes experimentation under
precisely controlled laboratory conditions as in science
Related to the Hayek-Lachmann distinction is the variability argument. The
argument is that the variability of economic conditions makes it impossible for
economic agents to apply the experimental method in a useful way.
Experimentation "only applies... to systems which are stable, repeatable, and
divisible, such as chemical systems...We cannot do experiments on unique
events, and we cannot experiment on the past" (Boulding 1981:10). The
one-way traffic of human history does not allow us to repeat market
experiments under precisely controlled conditions. Hence, entrepreneurs are
seldom (if ever) able to test their hypotheses by carrying out experiments.
Popper (1960: 86, Section 25) considers that the variability argument is
invalid. It is based upon a mistaken view of the experimental methods of the
physical sciences. Two physical experiments, which first appear to be
conducted under precisely similar conditions, may give rise to very different
results (e.g. as is the case with the production of high-temperature
superconductors, and the boiling of water at different altitudes).
Like economic agents, physicists are also sometimes very limited in their
ability to vary at will experimental conditions, especially if these require
different gravitational fields or extreme temperatures (Popper 1960: 97). In
many cases in experimental physics, it is very difficult to identify the factors
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specific to each experiment which lead to differing results. The method of
piecemeal experimentation must be applied to determine the kind and degree
of similarity between conditions which are required for experimental
reproducibility (Popper 1960: 94).
Thus, according to Popper, there is no fundamental difference between the
pre-scientific experiments of economic agents and the experimental
approaches of scientists because piecemeal experiments are fundamental to
both approaches. Differences in experimental conditions are differences of
degree rather than of kind (cf. Popper 1960: 85-87, 97).
(d) The Popperian conception of rationality contradicts the best-corroborated
theories in empirical psychology
Studies in cognitive psychology suggest that much of the time people do not
reason in accordance with the rules of logic (e.g. Anderson 1980; Johnson-Laird
1983, 1993). Empirical studies have found that many scientific researchers do
not even employ falsificationist strategies for a variety of inference tasks (e.g.
Mulkay and Gilbert 1981; Kern, Mirels and Hinshaw 1983). Thus, if scientists do
not have the wits to apply falsificationist strategies, how can economic agents be
expected to?
Several lines of argument could be advanced in response to this empirical
attack. First, a Popperian approach to entrepreneurship requires only that a
small minority of economic transactors be as sophisticated and open-minded in
their decision-making as Popperian-like scientists. In particular, entrepreneurs
may experience fewer cognitive boundaries for a specific complex problem than
other market participants.
Second, the Popperian approach focuses upon rational economic
decision-making and not on rational economic decision-makers (cf. Boland 1982,
p.177). The Popperian approach seeks only to provide a purely logical skeleton
of how entrepreneurs learn, not a description of the thought processes by which
flesh-and-blood entrepreneurs actually acquire knowledge. It is a psychologistic
error to propose that the rules of logic characterise actual cognitive processes.
Interpreted in this manner, economic decision-makers may in general only
approach the Popperian ideal of rational action. An ideal of rational action
influences entrepreneurial behaviour without rendering those entrepreneurs who
subscribe to it ideal.
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Third, doubt is expressed regarding the appeal to empirical psychology as the
metacriterion by which to judge competing theories of how entrepreneurs learn.
Popper's principle of transference claims that logical matters may be shifted to
psychological concerns but not vice versa. Boland applies this principle to
develop a case against a psychologistic view of rationality: "Psychologistic
rationality cannot be more than what is provided by logical arguments. Thus, any
discussion of rational decision-making need not involve psychology" (Boland
1982: 38-39). Furthermore, cognitive psychology is not as yet "explanatorily
adequate" to serve as a metacriterion for evaluating theories of learning
(Weimer 1974).
(e) The Popperian approach neglects important extralogical forces (especially
culture) which affect market processes
According to this argument, the acquisition of knowledge in an interpersonal
setting is a discursive process, proceeding by reorganisations, ruptures and
mutations in a disjointed manner. All learning is inseparable from its cultural
frame. The ideological values of people and the language through which
these values pass permeate people’s consciousness, affecting their
perceptions and learning activity. The Popperian approach fails to explain
how entrepreneurs’ learning is affected by culture, ideology and language.
In my view, it is indeed true that the Popperian approach does not
encompass sociological, cultural-anthropological or political aspects of
entrepreneurship. The Popperian approach develops a largely logical
perspective on entrepreneurial learning. It focuses upon the logical,
methodological and epistemological aspects of entrepreneurial activity. It
does not profess to provide an interdisciplinary account of entrepreneurship
and the market process. It investigates the latent structure of rationality
behind entrepreneurs’ problem-solving efforts in markets.
(f) The Popperian theory of entrepreneurship is not empirically testable or
falsifiable and hence it is not even scientific in a Popperian sense
The potential criticism is that the Popperian theory of entrepreneurship is not
scientific because it is not perationalised in a sufficiently falsifiable way,
because it cannot be applied in practical analyses of observed economic
behaviour, and/or because it is concerned with entrepreneurs’ learning
methodologies which are themselves not observable.
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I believe that the Popperian theory of entrepreneurship is indeed testable (in
any case, more so that at least two of its rivals -- the theories of Kirzner and
Casson). Harper (1996: Ch.10) describes a particular empirical test of thi
theory. In particular, I specify a possible test of the prediction that P pperian
entrepreneurs perform significantly better than entrepreneurs who adhere to
other learning methodologies. A  part of this empirical test, I propose a new
technique for determining the learning methodologies of individual
entrepreneurs which at the same time reduces the need for economic
researchers to make external r tionalisations of observed entrepreneurial
behaviour. Once the learning methodologies of a sample of entrepreneurs
have been identified, it would be possible to conduct statistical tests of the
theory’s predictions which posit a relationship between entrepreneurial
performance and entrepreneurial learning methodologies.
5 CONCLUSION
This paper has sought to present the outlines of a new Popperian approach
to entrepreneurship. By formally building in explicit conjectures about
entrepreneurs' learning methodologies and knowledge, the new approach
can lay the groundwork for explaining endogenous learning and the
endogenous dynamics of the market process. It can provide a way of
explaining the changes over time in economic agents' knowledge,
expectations and plans which form the basis of the competitive market
process.
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